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INTER ARMA SILENT MUSAE. CAN MILITARY NECESSITY GAG 
INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW?  
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The idea of military necessity originated in the law of armed conflict (the law of war), and, 
while it is one of its most fundamental concepts, it is also one of the most sinister and elusive 
ones (William Downey, 1953, p. 252). In the past it was often invoked as a justification for 
atrocious violations of the laws of war (see e.g. The Peleus case, Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals pp. 1-21). After the Second World War, military necessity has become a 
concept relevant also to the field of protection of cultural property in armed conflicts. 
Namely, it has been inserted into the treaty framework constituted by the Hague Convention 
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 14 May 1954 (the 
Hague Convention; articles 4 and 11)1 and later the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention 
of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 26 March 
1999 (the Second Protocol; article 6)2 as the exception to the generally binding rule of respect. 
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 Article 4. Respect for cultural property  
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the 
territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of 
the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of 
armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property.  
2. The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Article may be waived only in cases where military necessity 
imperatively requires such a waiver.  
3. The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, 
pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall refrain from 
requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party.  
4. They shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.  
5. No High Contracting Party may evade the obligations incumbent upon it under the present Article, in respect of another 
High Contracting Party, by reason of the fact that the latter has not applied the measures of safeguard referred to in Article 3. 
 
Article 11. Withdrawal of immunity  
1. If one of the High Contracting Parties commits, in respect of any item of cultural property under special protection, a 
violation of the obligations under Article 9, the opposing Party shall, so long as this violation persists, be released from the 
obligation to ensure the immunity of the property concerned. Nevertheless, whenever possible, the latter Party shall first 
request the cessation of such violation within a reasonable time.  
2. Apart from the case provided for in paragraph 1 of the present Article, immunity shall be withdrawn from cultural property 
under special protection only in exceptional cases of unavoidable military necessity, and only for such time as that necessity 
continues. Such necessity can be established only by the officer commanding a force the equivalent of a division in size or 
larger. Whenever circumstances permit, the opposing Party shall be notified, a reasonable time in advance, of the decision to 
withdraw immunity.  
3. The Party withdrawing immunity shall, as soon as possible, so inform the Commissioner-General for cultural property 
provided for in the Regulations for the execution of the Convention, in writing, stating the reasons. 
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 Article 6 Respect for cultural property 
With the goal of ensuring respect for cultural property in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention:  
a. a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be 
invoked to direct an act of hostility against cultural property when and for as long as:  
i. that cultural property has, by its function, been made into a military objective; and  
ii. there is no feasible alternative available to obtain a similar military advantage to that offered by directing an act of hostility 
against that objective; 
b. a waiver on the basis of imperative military necessity pursuant to Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Convention may only be 
invoked to use cultural property for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage when and for as long as 
no choice is possible between such use of the cultural property and another feasible method for obtaining a similar military 
advantage;  
c. the decision to invoke imperative military necessity shall only be taken by an officer commanding a force the equivalent of 
a battalion in size or larger, or a force smaller in size where circumstances do not permit otherwise;  
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Consequently, whether the basic obligation under the Hague Convention to respect cultural 
property in armed conflicts is binding on a belligerent depends on whether the competent 
military commander believes that he or she is in the presence of military necessity or not. This 
paper will address problems connected with the interpretation of this notion and their possible 
impact on the fate of cultural heritage in armed conflicts.  
 
2. Specific Problems related to Military Necessity 
 
2.1. Lack of Definition 
To date, military necessity has not been appropriately defined in international law. In different 
periods of history scholars have advanced various hypotheses as to the effect that it may have 
on the law (McCoubrey, 1991, p. 218). Present-day scholarship agrees that there is no general 
clause of military necessity in international law, and so it may only be invoked when there is a 
specific permission to do so in given provision of a treaty (Toman, 1996, p. 73, Venturini, 
1988, pp. 123-131). That notwithstanding, the lack of a clear definition of this notion 
inevitably affects the relative decision-making process on the battlefield also when cultural 
property is at stake. In fact, the vagueness of the concept itself makes it easier to justify 
abuses of the laws of war, also those prohibiting the destruction or damaging of cultural 
property, through the argument of military necessity. 
When making a decision on whether protected cultural property is to be attacked, a military 
commander might, on the one hand, overestimate the gravity of the situation and decide on an 
attack which is not indispensable, or, on the other hand, knowingly abuse this escape clause 
where it is, again, not necessary but only militarily convenient. In the first case, the 
commander might for instance assume that it is militarily necessary and thus justified to 
attack a cultural site. The latter scenario – an abusive use of the exception – will be addressed 
in the section below.  
2.2. Risk of Abuse 
As a consequence of the vagueness of the notion of military necessity, military commanders 
have a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether a given situation is sufficiently 
serious to justify disregarding the rule of respect for cultural property. In turn, this may 
involve a risk as they are usually naturally inclined to preserve as much freedom from legal 
restraints in waging war as possible. This latitude of military commanders has been curtailed 
in the Second Protocol, which lists a number of requirements that need to be fulfilled for a 
given situation to be considered a military necessity (see footnote 2). However, this solution is 
still far from being perfect, inter alia because it requires that there be no feasible alternative to 
obtain a similar military advantage, the latter being again a notion which can hardly be 
measured and therefore inevitably remaining dependent on subjective judgment of a military 
commander. Another problem is that only 64 out of 126 States Parties to the Hague 
Convention have decided to become Parties to the Second Protocol.3 In other words, nearly a 
half of the total number of States Parties to the Hague Convention are not bound by the rules 
of the Second Protocol. Arguably, these States have significant liberty to invoke military 
necessity in the presence of any military interest whatsoever. Should they wish to use this 
excuse to account for violations of rules protecting cultural property, they would probably not 
be deemed to have infringed the Convention thanks to this all-encompassing waiver. This 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
d. in case of an attack based on a decision taken in accordance with sub-paragraph (a), an effective advance warning shall be 
given whenever circumstances permit.  
3
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would be a classic example of an ‘’exception eating the rule’’ scenario, i.e. permitting a 
behaviour that the Convention has actually been drafted to outlaw. Should this verify itself, 
the overall perspectives for the fate of cultural property at war are rather grim.   
2.3. The “Polyphonic Discourse” on Military Necessity 
 
This situation is not helped by the fact that diverse professional circles often attribute different 
connotations to the notion of military necessity, creating what may be called a “polyphonic 
discourse” on military necessity. O’Brien (1957, p. 117) distinguishes between the legal and 
military understanding of military necessity. The military circles are not bound by neither 
legal nor philosophical considerations as to what constitutes necessity. In practice, the 
military discourse typically avails itself of a much broader understanding of necessity than the 
one used by lawyers (O’Brien, ibidem). In the most extreme of cases, a situation classified as 
a state of military necessity by the military might even conflict with a legal rule (O’Brien, 
1957, p. 116). From the views expressed by representatives of the military at the Hague 
Conference in 1954 it is clear that there are at least three different approaches to the relation 
of military necessity and the law (Toman, 1996, p. 75, Records, para. 264, pp. 140-141) In 
fact, the common military perception of military necessity is that of an essential element of 
decision-making at strategic, operational and tactical level and does not consider it in any way 
as an extraordinary circumstance (see for example the U.S. Operational Law Handbook, 2012, 
pp. 10-12). To avoid confusion, it is advisable to reserve the broader, military understanding 
to non-normative texts, such as military reports or literature. 
Another vast connotation of military necessity is oftentimes part of the political discourse, 
especially when high rank politicians endeavour to thus justify breaches of humanitarian law 
and human rights law.4 It seems that sometimes the temptation to use a sweeping excuse 
along the lines of “raison de guerre” or even “raison d’état” proves too strong to resist. By 
contrast, groups interested in ensuring undisturbed applicability of rules protecting socially 
important assets from risks connected with warfare, such as art historians, archaeologists, 
environmental preservationists, human rights activists, or even indigenous or local 
populations, might be expected to defend a very narrow interpretation of military necessity. 
All things considered, one is right to observe that military necessity is an extremely confusing 
and elusive notion, with a dangerous potential for the observance of law. That is why the issue 
of its interpretation in the practice of armed conflicts must be approached with extreme 
caution. Moreover, it is in the best interest of cultural heritage of all mankind that this notion 
be as clear as possible.5   
3. Military Necessity in the Law of Armed Conflict and in Cultural Heritage Law 
 
3.1.  Military Necessity in the Law of War 
As already mentioned above, military necessity is a notion that has its origins in the law of 
war. In spite of the fact that military necessity is often treated as a uniform legal concept, 
there is no single understanding of military necessity to simultaneously fit different contexts 
in which it is used in that field of law.  
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 See e.g. the memorandum of February 7, 2002 of President G. W. Bush concerning the applicability of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949 to the treatment of detainees in the War on Terror 
following the events of September 11, 2001. See in particular points 3 and 5 of the memorandum, available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02.07.pdf (last visited: 29.01.13) 
5
 See the preamble to the Hague Convention, recitals 2 and 3.   
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The crux of all norms of the law of war relative to the manner of conducting hostilities has 
always been inspired by military necessity in its broader sense, which is recognized as one of 
the basic principles informing this branch of international law (Maugeri, 2008, p. 5, Venturini, 
1988, pp. 123-131). Traditionally, it would render lawful, both in qualitative and quantitative 
terms, the volume of military force necessary for the attainment of the main objective of a 
belligerent, i.e. the complete (or partial) submission of the enemy (Venturini, 1988, p. 123, 
Rogers, 2004, p. 5) This chronologically first understanding of military necessity was used to 
justify the use of force between belligerents (Venturini, 1988, p. 123). However, its 
perception has changed in time and now it is more often formulated as a prohibition or 
limitation on the use of force (Rogers, 2004, p. 6). Following the current approach, conduct 
involving the use of violence which goes beyond the limits of what is necessary to defeat the 
enemy cannot be justified through military necessity sensu largo. In short, the purpose of this 
concept is to assess the appropriateness of the volume of violence employed by a fighting 
party. According to Ronzitti (2001, p. 174), military necessity sensu largo does not differ 
notably from the principle of proportionality.  
Permissive character is, on the other hand, an exclusive characteristic of military necessity in 
the strict sense. It denotes a circumstance which precludes the wrongfulness of an action 
otherwise prohibited by law. Military necessity sensu stricto has to be incorporated in an 
explicit provision derogating a general obligation imposed by law (Maugeri, 2008, p. 2, 
Ronzitti, 2001, p. 174, Toman, 2009, p. 88., Venturini, 1988, p. 125), such as that in the 
already mentioned article 4 of the Hague Convention, article 6 of the Second Protocol and, 
regarding general civilian property, article 23 (g) of the Regulations respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention. The reason underlying this 
limitation is that military necessity had already been taken into consideration in the norm-
making process of the laws of war.  
 
3.2.  The “Importation” of Military Necessity into the Framework for the Protection of 
Cultural Heritage. Military Necessity in the Hague Convention  
Military necessity is the only exception to the general rule of protection of cultural property 
expressed in article 4 of the 1954 Hague Convention. Considered as one of its major 
shortcomings, military necessity has been a contentious issue already during the preparatory 
works on the Convention (Francioni, 2002, p. 323, Gioia, 2002, p. 17). As the central point of 
the delicate balance between military demands and the protection of cultural property in 
armed conflicts, it was however bound to raise controversies (Frigo, 1986, p. 100). It should 
be noted that the waiver of military necessity was not present in the initial draft of the 
Convention as presented at the UNESCO Conference convened in 1954. It was inserted into 
the text during the Diplomatic Conference, upon clear request of a minority of states. During 
the negotiations few delegates have actually expressed interest in the possibility to waive the 
most fundamental conventional obligations on such grounds.  
Two respective tendencies were manifested at the Diplomatic Conference. The “realists” - 
among these Belgium, Israel and the Netherlands - favoured this exception, contending that 
the new convention had to be above all militarily applicable. The “idealists”, such as the 
USSR and Greece, argued that the military necessity waiver was a retrograde step with 
respect to previous achievements of international law in this regard, and so it should be 
eliminated from the text, or at least significantly restricted. An interesting view was presented 
by the Swiss delegate at the Conference. He felt that the vagueness of this notion was of no 
great importance, as “the Convention was above all an affair of good faith” (Toman, 2009, p. 
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91). However, some of the States of greatest military potential threatened not to ratify the 
Convention, if the waiver they insisted upon was not included in the Convention (Zagato, 
2007, p. 74). Thus, not willing to risk lack of ratification on part of the dissenting States, it 
was decided that the reference to military necessity should be made (Gioia, 2002, p. 17). 
Regrettably, the States in question did not ratify the Convention immediately, regardless of 
having had such significant influence on its content.6   
3.3. Military Necessity in the Treaty Framework for the Protection of Cultural Heritage 
One is right to wonder whether the same distinction between military necessity sensu largo 
and stricto known to the law of war applies in the same manner to cultural heritage law. After 
all, these are two, albeit related, disparate branches of the law. In particular, the fact that 
military necessity is one of the most basic principles on which the law of war is based, does 
not in itself imply that it will be treated as such in cultural heritage law. The latter branch of 
international law does not concern itself with hostilities and so does not need rules limiting 
wartime violence. It seems then only logical that it should not be seen as an autonomous 
principle there as in the law of war, but only an exception to particular rules regulating 
behaviour during armed conflict, where its interpretation ought to be very narrow. This 
corresponds to the law of war’s military necessity sensu stricto.  
However, even if we concede that it is nothing but an exception in the field of cultural 
heritage protection, the problem of interpretation of this notion remains, especially as it is not 
a monolith – a reading of the Hague Convention is conducive to thinking that there can be 
various ‘’degrees’’ of military necessity. In fact, the 1954 Hague Convention provides for two 
protective regimes, each of them requiring a different, as it would appear, type of military 
necessity as a ground for waiving the obligation to respect cultural property. The use of 
ordinary cultural property, its immediate surroundings or the appliances in use for its 
protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage, or an attack 
against such property is lawful only where it is dictated by imperative military necessity 
(Article 4 para. 1 and 2, see footnote 1). By contrast, the immunity of property covered by 
special protection, understood as protection from hostile acts and from the use for military 
purposes is withdrawn only in exceptional cases of unavoidable military necessity, and only 
for such time as that necessity continues (article 11 para. 2, ibidem). One is justified in 
wondering where does the actual difference lay. The use of qualifying adjectives 
“imperative”, “exceptional” and “unavoidable” might suggest that there is a third type of 
military necessity, an “ordinary” one. It is no easy task to translate this slightly absurd 
categorization into practice, and the military is often understandably at a loss as to how to 
differentiate between these extraordinary circumstances, while the treaty itself gives no 
explanation in this regard.  
In fact, it is very interesting to observe how the military copes with this problem. During a 
lecture given in the framework of a workshop on the protection of cultural property in armed 
conflicts organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in Sanremo on 13-15 
December 2010, retired US Army Colonel Jackson said that a military commander must 
“think twice before attacking cultural property, and think thrice before attacking cultural 
property under special protection”. At the same time, most scholars insist that there is no 
differentia specifica between these categories (Nahlik, 1975-1976, p. 1069). However, as the 
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 Turkey ratified the Convention on 15.12.1965, the United Stated only on 13.03.2009, whereas the United Kingdom has yet 
to do so. On the other hand, the United States confirmed that it considers the 1954 Hague Convention customary international 
law. 
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regime of special protection did not prove particularly attractive to Parties to the 1954 Hague 
Convention, and just a few sites in total have been entered into the Register of Cultural 
Property under Special Protection, so in practice the military did not need to build a sliding-
scale of different cases of military necessity dividing them into more and less compelling and 
this problem remains largely theoretical.  
In order to replace the ineffective special protection regime under the Hague Convention, the 
Second Protocol introduces a regime of enhanced protection for cultural property. This 
protection may only be lost in circumstances specified in Article 13 of the Second Protocol, 
which makes no reference whatsoever to military necessity. The property may only be subject 
to attack in order to terminate its use as a military objective. According to Henckaerts (2010, 
p. 34), the only practical difference between the two regimes of protection is that it is 
absolutely prohibited to convert cultural property under enhanced protection into a military 
objective by using it for military purposes. A holder of property included on the List of 
Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection who uses it for such purposes is liable to 
punishment as a war criminal. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Even though the insertion of a military necessity waiver into treaties significantly weakens 
their protective force, the practice of leaving this gateway open continues and is unlikely to 
end anytime soon, as it is an expression of interests that are perceived as vital by many actors 
in the international arena. As Falk put it (1982, p. 80), “what dominant states find militarily 
useful in war is unlikely to be prohibited, and, if it is, the prohibition is unlikely to be 
respected in the next war, unless ideas about the usefulness of the activity have shifted.” 
Indeed, the exception of military necessity may be sometimes treated as a “back door” to let 
political and military agendas pass through. In that sense, military necessity may become 
military expediency where actors in the international arena want to pursue their goals 
unrestrained by the laws and customs of war. In this case cultural heritage would fall short of 
treaty protection, and that in turn is likely to result in damage and destruction which could 
possibly be avoided otherwise. All States Parties to the Hague Convention ought to take all 
steps possible to make sure that this grim scenario does not fulfil itself.7 
Military necessity as a notion used in the Hague Convention and the Second Protocol ought to 
be interpreted in a very restrictive manner, as, primo, it is an exception to an otherwise 
binding rule (following the Latin directive of interpretation exceptiones non sunt 
extendendae). Secundo, this otherwise binding rule to protect cultural property is not just any 
rule – it enshrines a model of conduct which is the core obligation imposed by the Convention 
on its States Parties and, perhaps more importantly, an internationally recognized customary 
and conventional rule dictated by public conscience (see generally Francioni, 2007 and 
Toman, 1996, p. 68) 
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